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Abstract	
This article examines the users of Finnish populist counter-media (PCM) websites with 
the aim of exploring their motives for consuming and engaging with populist online 
media content. The article is based on a qualitative analysis of 24 semi-structured, 
focused interviews. We conclude that consuming and engaging with populist counter-
media content is typically motivated by scepticism and mistrust of legacy media 
journalism and aspirations of constructing and sharing representations and narratives 
that challenge those of the dominant public sphere. These efforts are often motivated 
by deeply held personal beliefs and political stances. Three user profiles are devised 
to illustrate different types of counter-media users: (1) system sceptics, who express 
all-encompassing societal mistrust; (2) agenda critics, who express politicised criticism 
towards media representations of selected themes; and (3) the casually discontent, 
who sporadically browse sites for alternative information and entertainment. 
Keywords 
Counter-media, fake news, media mistrust, partisan media, populism, right-
wing media 
Introduction 
The rise of global right-wing populism, the United Kingdom’s vote to leave the European Union 
(Brexit) and the US presidential election of 2016 ushered in a massive surge of public debate over 
the consequences of fake news in online news consumption (e.g. Guess, Nyhan & Reifler, 2018; 
Silverman, 2016; Silverman & Singer-Vine, 2016). Simultaneously, concern has been growing 
over the proliferation of partisan media websites, such as Breitbart News Network in the United 
States, that are seen as the driving forces behind contemporary political polarisation (Faris et al., 
2017; Marwick & Lewis, 2017). These phenomena have often been lumped together to form a 
frame of the post-truth era, a threat narrative in which the erosion of truth and facts endangers the 
institution of journalism and the foundations of Western democracy (Vuorelma, 2017). 
The post-truth narrative has been accompanied by moral concern over the audience’s media 
literacy (Vuorelma, 2017). Within this narrative, media users who consume partisan online 
content have stereotypically been labelled as misguided and as having insufficient media literacy, 
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and the producers of this content have been portrayed as manipulators who are willing to use lies 
and deceit to advance their political agendas (e.g. boyd, 2018; Marwick & Lewis, 2017). Proposed 
solutions typically have revolved around increased media literacy programs and a proliferation of 
expert fact checking. These solutions, as pointed out by boyd (2017), largely ignore ‘the cultural 
context of information consumption’. 
In addition, these characterisations and solutions are based largely on assumptions, as little 
empirical research has been done on the audience or producers of this type of partisan online 
media material. The participatory communication infrastructure within the contemporary hybrid 
media system has provided new kinds of possibilities to partake in creating, steering and 
manipulating information flows (Chadwick, 2017). This has made it easier for any online user to 
establish alternative media and news websites, and to access media material that can be used to 
construct and support various political and ideological positions. An interview-based study by 
Holt (2017) regarding the contributors to Swedish immigration-critical alternative media (ICAM) 
and a survey study by Rauch (2015) focusing on alternative media perceptions of hybrid audiences 
can be seen as the first attempts to construct an empirical understanding of the motivations for 
consuming and engaging with this type of media. 
This article examines how and why Finnish users consume and engage with partisan online 
media content. Based on our previous content analysis (Noppari & Hiltunen, 2018) and previous 
research on the Finnish sites (Ylä-Anttila, 2018), we propose a concept of populist counter-media 
to describe the newly emerged Finnish partisan websites. By conducting research among this user 
segment, we are aiming to fill the research gap left by previous studies and provide a more 
nuanced picture of the users’ motives and intentions through analysing how they discursively 
construct and assess consuming and engaging with this type of media content. The outlook is 
descriptive-analytical. Instead of taking a normative stance, our aim is to determine and 
understand the motives of individuals engaged in this type of content consumption and 
production. 
Our aims can be summarised in the following research questions: 
RQ1: Why do the users consume or produce populist online counter-media content? 
What kind of motivations can be identified? 
RQ2: How do the users view the relationship between legacy media journalism and 
populist counter-media? 
RQ3: How do the users see the societal and political roles and significance of populist 
counter-media in Finland? 
First, we outline the concept of populist counter-media, then we present the Finnish media 
environment and political context. This is followed by an introduction to our methodology and 
research sample and a summary of our findings, introducing three counter-media user profiles. 
This article contributes to the ongoing discussion of alternative media, online populism and fake 
news. 
Background and terminology: Outlining populist counter-media 
Partisan online media and news websites can be categorised as a form of alternative media, a 
concept referring broadly to all forms of media that provide alternatives to the dominant discourse 
in the mainstream media (Atton, 2015; Bailey, Cammaerts & Carpentier, 2008); however, the 
concept is too broad to provide analytical clarity, so a more precise term is needed to pinpoint 
the specifics of the type of media on which this study focuses. Researchers have used multiple 
concepts to further describe and analytically separate different orientations and types of the newly 
emerged sites in various national contexts, such as user-generated hyper-partisan news (Bastos & 
Mercea, 2017) and hyper-partisan news outlets (Marwick & Lewis, 2017). When examining sites 
Noppari, Hiltunen & Ahva: User profiles for populist counter-media websites in Finland 25 
 
with an explicit right-wing or anti-immigration focus, concepts such as ‘right-wing media’ (Faris 
et al., 2017), ‘alt-right media’ (Marwick & Lewis, 2017), ‘immigration critical alternative media’ 
(Holt, 2017) and ‘far-right alternative online media’ (Figenschou & Ihlebæk, 2018) have been 
used. Finnish researchers previously have referred to the Finnish media websites as ‘countermedia’ 
(Ylä-Anttila, 2018) and ‘fake media’ (Haasio, Ojaranta & Mattila, 2017). 
The Finnish sites share many similarities with Swedish ICAM-sites (Holt, 2017), characterised 
by their strong, confrontational opposition to the dominant interpretations circulating in the public 
sphere. The sites also circulate counter-discourses on specific issues, and aim to build a public 
around them. Holt’s (2017: 5–12) interviewees did not consider their outlets to be ‘alternative’ in 
the form of ‘an equivalent “interchangeable” alternative to the established journalistic media’, but 
rather as complementary media whose purpose was to oppose, challenge and offer alternatives 
to established media coverage and discussion within specific areas. 
A few key differences between the Finnish and Swedish sites, however, rendered the concept 
of ICAM unsuitable for our study. First, while most of the Finnish sites have anti-immigration 
profiles, not all of them share this position, opting instead for leftist anti-establishment stances. 
Second, we found it problematic to describe the Finnish sites as purely alternative, as they are 
mainly reactive, relying heavily on reframing mainstream media content (Toivanen & Nelimarkka 
2018).  
Based on our previous content analysis of the most popular Finnish counter-media site, MV-
lehti (roughly translates as WTF-magazine), and non-participant observation of three other 
counter-media sites and their social media communities (Noppari & Hiltunen, 2018), we 
concluded that the stories typically were based on material extracted from legacy media news, 
other existing media sources and social media. The sites selected their stories carefully, however, 
to fit their ideological profiles and to communicate specific political narratives (see also Haller & 
Holt, 2018: 10–12; Holt, 2017: 11–12). The ideological profiles of these sites were diverse: MV-
lehti was an anti-immigration, right-wing site with a strong anti-establishment sentiment; Oikea 
Media (The Right Media) was a conservative right-wing nationalist site with an anti-Islam stance 
and a backdrop of charismatic Christianity; Kansalainen (Citizen) was a nationalist and 
conservative site with an anti-immigration and anti-EU-focus; and Vastavalkea (Counterfire)1 was 
a left-wing site criticising neoliberalism, economic elites and Western geopolitics. 
With a focus on Finnish sites with anti-immigration profiles, Ylä-Anttila (2018: 357) 
describes their operating models as spreading politically charged news and sometimes 
intentionally blurring the lines between fact and fiction, but most often combining facts with 
rumours, cherry-picking, colouring and framing information to promote a radical anti-immigrant 
agenda. These production practices reflect online and remix cultures, where all available content 
is seen as raw material for reuse (e.g. Phillips, 2015). 
For these reasons, we found the counter-media concept more feasible for describing the 
Finnish sites, as they aim at creating counter-publics by utilising mainstream content. Fraser (1992: 
123) defines counter-publics as ‘parallel discursive arenas where members of subordinated social 
groups invent and circulate counter-discourses to formulate oppositional interpretations of their 
identities, interests and needs’. Warner (2002: 56–7) notes, however, that the counter-publics do 
not always have to be subordinate in relation to the dominant public sphere, but may acquire 
agency. Downey and Fenton (2003: 193–4) add that counter-publics do not simply exist 
independently from the dominant public sphere, but seek to actively challenge it. Fraser (1992: 
124) raises another key point: such publics are not necessarily virtuous, as some are anti-
democratic, and those with democratic intentions are not always able to function without their 
own modes of exclusion and marginalisation. 
After analysing the political discourse and rhetoric on these sites more closely, we decided 
to add the epithet of populism to describe their communication practices. Based on our analysis 
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(Noppari & Hiltunen, 2018), the sites’ political positions did not often correspond with traditional 
party-politics in Finland and were sometimes difficult to pinpoint accurately on the traditional 
left–right political continuum. Instead, they engaged in reflexive politics, endemic to an online 
communication environment. Instead of stemming from traditional party or class identities, 
reflexive politics is driven by issues, values and positions set by the participating actors themselves 
(Häyhtiö & Rinne, 2008). Selected issues and stances therefore become the focal points in all the 
decision-making of reflexive politics. Identification with issues, rather than formal affiliation with 
a single party or movement, provides the sites’ flexibility and enables them to act as an umbrella 
under which different actors can convene.  
Regardless of the political or ideological orientation, Finnish counter-media sites constructed 
an explicit separation between ‘the elite’ and ‘the people’ – ordinary Finnish citizens who were 
also invited along to contribute to the sites (Noppari & Hiltunen, 2018). Discursively, the sites 
explicitly positioned themselves as representatives of ‘the people’ against the establishment and 
elites. In addition, they constructed out-groups, presented as threats to the well-being of ordinary 
citizens. On the right-wing-oriented sites, these ‘others’ were ethnic and religious minorities or 
political groups that supported liberal values and multiculturalism, while on the left-wing sites, 
the out-groups were supporters of financial neoliberalism and Western geopolitics. Hence the 
basic societal outlook of these sites was consistent with the minimal definition of populism as thin 
ideology, dividing society into two antagonistic groups: ‘the pure people’ and ‘the corrupted elite’, 
and demanding that politics should represent the will of the people (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2013: 
149–50).  
The concept of populism has been the subject of controversy, partly because of the debate 
about whether it should be understood as constituting a fully-fledged political ideology or a style 
of communication (e.g. Krämer, 2014; De Cleen & Stavrakakis, 2017). In this article, we 
understand populism as a particular mode of articulation (Laclau, 2005) and ‘a discursive strategy 
that juxtaposes the virtuous populace with a corrupt elite’ (Bonikowski & Gidron, 2016: 1593–4). 
It can take different forms, from left wing to right wing, as the key element in populist discourse 
is an unfilled social demand neglected by those with power. Populist communication usually has 
been observed in relation to journalism, political parties, charismatic leaders and established 
political actors (see e.g. Aalberg & de Vreese, 2017; Engesser et al., 2017; Groshek & Koc-
Michalska, 2017). However, in the hybrid media environment, media users can increasingly 
contribute to populist discourses; counter-media, discussion groups and online communities are 
some of the sites where populist protest is articulated today (cf. Das, 2018). 
There are several reasons why populist discourse thrives even better in the counter-media 
environment than it does in legacy media journalism. Examining media populism, Krämer (2014) 
points out that, in order to gain populist appeal, legacy media has to make the audience forget its 
close links to the establishment and political elite. Furthermore, even the more populist forms of 
journalism follow various professional norms and news criteria, and they cannot publish a 
populist vision of politics in general (Krämer, 2014: 51) Here, counter-media have an advantage, 
as they do not have to follow commercial logic, journalistic conventions or ethical principles: 
they can be as radical and polemical as they wish. In addition, the production practices of the 
counter-media sites support the formation of ‘the people’ as the in-group and collective user 
identity. Yet the Finnish sites did not represent entirely open publishing or peer-production 
(Benkler, 2016), as they had a small cluster of core contributors who, besides producing material 
themselves, acted also as a sort of editorial team, making publication decisions over user-
submitted content (Noppari & Hiltunen, 2018). 
Consequently, to describe the newly emerged Finnish websites, we propose a concept of 
populist counter-media (PCM), defined as alternative media with reactive and confrontational 
stances towards the dominant public sphere, utilising ideological and stylistic elements of 
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populism. The sites fit the definition of counter-publics (Downey & Fenton, 2003; Fraser, 1992) 
and exhibit distinct characteristics of ‘thin’ populism and communicational elements of media 
populism (Krämer, 2014: 48–9). This concept is not bound to a particular political or ideological 
orientation, but can be used to describe media formed around any combination of politicised 
issues, reflecting the reactive nature of reflexive politics (Häyhtiö & Rinne, 2008). The concept 
can therefore be used flexibly to describe multiple forms of media that incorporate populist 
articulation and style, with the explicit objective of challenging the representations and definitions 
in the dominant public sphere within specific areas, and fostering a reactive counter-public. 
Case selection: The Finnish media system and populist counter-media websites 
The Finnish media system offers an interesting setting for alternative media research. As a Nordic 
country, Finland has a multiparty political system and a democratic-corporatist media system (Hallin 
& Mancini, 2004), wherein the combination of strong journalistic professionalism and public service 
broadcasting traditionally has resulted in a very high public trust in journalism (Nord, 2008). In 2017, 
Finland had the highest overall public trust in the news of all the countries measured, with 62 per 
cent of the respondents stating that they ‘can trust most news most of the time’ (Reuters Institute, 
2017: 20–1). Also noteworthy is the almost complete withering of politically affiliated newspapers. 
Finland has gradually been drifting towards a politically neutral press system since the 1960s, with 
all the major dailies declared independent (Nord, 2008: 102–3).  
While the overall level of trust in the media has remained relatively high, the alternative 
media sphere in Finland has not traditionally been very active. During the last decade, however, 
online anti-immigration activism has strengthened, developing in the same way as observed by 
Holt (2017: 4) in Sweden. Since 2000, numerous blogs and discussion forums critical of 
immigration and the mainstream media’s portrayal of issues related to immigration have been 
established in Finland, resulting in the formation of an online anti-immigration counter-public 
(Horsti & Nikunen, 2015: 493–5). As the 2015 European migrant crisis functioned as a catalyst 
when the majority of new PCM sites were established, the anti-immigration sites could tap into 
existing online and grassroots anti-immigration activism. 
There are also empirical indications of growing media mistrust among some segments of the 
population of Finland. In a 2016 survey, 71 per cent of supporters of the populist Finns Party and 
73 per cent of supporters of extra-parliamentary parties agreed that they had lost trust in the 
traditional media (Pitkänen, 2016). The Finns Party has publicly expressed mistrust in and 
criticism of legacy media outlets (Hatakka, Niemi & Välimäki, 2017). While this may be viewed 
as an expression of the populists’ tendency to position themselves as outsiders to the establishment 
and blame the media for siding with the elite (Wodak, 2015), there are indications that negative 
immigration stances correlate with mistrust in legacy media outlets (e.g. Holt, 2017; Pitkänen, 
2016). When surveyed, members of the Finns Party also expressed a significantly higher level of 
trust in the most well-known anti-immigration Finnish PCM site, MV-lehti (Koivula, Saarinen & 
Koiranen, 2016). 
Methods and research material  
Our research had an exploratory character, as it focused on user segments with little previous 
empirical research (Stebbins, 2001). As the objective was to provide a better understanding of 
individuals engaged with Finnish populist PCM websites, the study was conducted in the 
qualitative research tradition.  
Our research material consists of 24 semi-structured, focused interviews with users who 
consumed and engaged with Finnish counter-media. Half of the interviewees (12 people) actively 
produced counter-media content or administered PCM sites themselves, while the other half 
(12 people) were followers and often active participants in sites’ social media communities. It is 
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noteworthy that online counter-media production practices often dissolve the separation between 
the consumer and the producer of media content (cf. Bruns, 2005). The latter group of 
interviewees sometimes also participated in the production processes – for example, by suggesting 
topics or allowing their social media comments or blog posts to be republished on the sites. The 
interviews were inspired by previous qualitative audience research that mapped audiences’ media 
use and experience profiles (e.g. Schrøder & Phillips, 2005) and audiences’ trust in the news 
(e.g. Coleman, Morrison & Anthony, 2012). Due to the novelty of the topic, however, the material 
was analysed by way of inductive qualitative categorising (Mayring, 2000). 
The interviewees were recruited using a variety of non-probability sampling methods, 
including critical case sampling and snowball sampling (Marshall, 1996).2 The interviews were 
conducted between November 2016 and March 2018, with sixteen of them conducted via phone 
or Skype and eight in person. Because the subject-matter was controversial, the interview material 
has been used anonymously. This was communicated to the interviewees in advance to combat 
social desirability bias (Nederhof, 1985). The focused interviews were semi-structured, with 
interview guides, and divided into three broader themes (media usage and political orientation; 
consuming and engaging with counter-media; and perceptions of the relationship between 
counter-media and legacy media). The interviews each lasted on average 60 to 90 minutes and 
were recorded and later transcribed verbatim. Due to the sampling method and qualitative 
approach, the study sample should not be considered representative, but rather illustrative, which 
is also reflected in the reporting of the findings. 
Our sample was demographically diverse: it included both highly and less educated 
individuals and ranged from well-off professionals to pensioned and unemployed persons. Both 
men and women were represented, but the most typical interviewee was male and aged 30–
50 years. This heterogeneity might indicate that counter-media usage, at least on some level, 
transcends the traditional demographic variables or explanations that are often used to explain 
support for populism (e.g. Norris & Inglehart, 2016).  
The interviewees’ political views were also diverse. In our sample, the majority supported 
the populist Finns Party, but other parliamentary and extra-parliamentary parties, from left to right, 
were also supported. Some expressed that no existing Finnish party represented their political 
beliefs. While some participated actively in parliamentary politics, others stated that they had 
completely lost their faith in representative democracy. A few were politically active in other ways 
– belonging, for example, to anti-immigration protest movements.  
Three user profiles of populist counter-media 
The only overarching common features of all the interviewees were the central role of online 
media in their media usage and the evident critique of legacy media, elites and the establishment. 
This criticism can be described as media scepticism, defined by Tsfati (2003: 67) as ‘a subjective 
feeling of alienation and mistrust towards the mainstream media’, conveying mistrust of the way 
‘mainstream news institutions function in society’. 
While this mistrust and media scepticism were the central findings in our study, we 
constructed three counter-media user profiles (Table 1) to further illustrate different attitudes and 
stances regarding both legacy media and PCM and their roles in society. The profiles should not 
be understood as representations of individual interviewees, nor as clearly fixed or mutually 
exclusive. Rather, they are compositions and serve as a vehicle for exemplifying different 
combinations of motivations, assessments and definitions provided by the interviewees. 
The first profile consists of system sceptics, who expressed all-encompassing mistrust of the 
media but also of society, echoing strong feelings of social alienation. The second profile comprises 
agenda critics, who hold strong opinions and views of selected issues and often feel that journalism 
does not represent their views fairly because of the political and ideological agendas of the media. The 
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last category is for the casually discontent audience members, who criticise phenomena like 
tabloidisation and sensationalism, and the conduct of individual journalists. 
 
Table 1: User profiles of Finnish populist counter-media websites 
 System sceptics Agenda critics Casually discontent 
Journalism See journalism as a tool 
for economic and 
political elites to 
maintain their power 
and status quo. 
Deep system-level 
mistrust. 
Believe ‘media elites’ 
have their own political 
and ideological agendas 
that are projected onto 
journalism. 
Believe individual 
journalists cause biases in 
journalism. 






Have strong ideological 
beliefs and even 
revolutionary hopes for 
counter-publics. 
Believe that counter-
media is needed to 
challenge journalism and 
diversify public 
discussion in Finland. 
See journalism as an 
instrument for societal 
change. 
Do not see counter-media 
as an arena for serious 
societal struggle. 
Consume content for 
alternative or additional 




counter-media sites but 
also increasingly use 
their own online 
channels, like YouTube, 
to promote their views. 
Produce and/or share 
counter-media stories. 
Belong to the sites’ social 
media groups. 
Sporadically follow counter-
media and may belong to 
their social media groups. 
May occasionally share 




Most responsive to 
radical claims or online 
conspiracy theories. 
Prone to hostile media 
perceptions. 
Often feel that media 
content is biased against 
their views and opinions. 
Constant irony and savvy 
scepticism as a way to 
consume online content. 
Dialogue Unlikely to change their 
opinions. 
Do not seek and/or 
refuse dialogue with 
legacy media journalists. 
Seek dialogue with 
journalism but on their 
own terms. 
Strive to gain a legitimate 
position in public 
discussion. 
May participate in dialogue 
with journalists through 
news comments or social 
media, but do not actively 
seek it. 
 
System sceptics are societal outsiders 
The system sceptics expressed holistic mistrust of the establishment and society, echoing a 
traditional critique of media as an ideological tool for the political and economic elite 
(see, e.g., Herman & Chomsky, 1988), but also incorporating elements of conspiratorial thought 
similar to ‘the paranoid style’ described by Hofstadter (1966). 
The system sceptics’ critiques reflected their broad systemic-level suspicion that emphasised 
connections between the legacy media and the establishment, thus highlighting the media’s role 
in upholding the status quo. Journalism was seen as reflecting the interests of corporate media 
owners, the ruling politicians or global corporations. These views mirror the societal analysis of 
classic populism as grounded in the radical distinction between the common people and the 
ruling elite. Besides siding with the elite on political issues, growing commercialisation and the 
proliferation of entertainment were seen as indications of elite media control. Trivial 
sensationalism was often considered a red herring, used to divert the attention of the audience 
from important political matters when needed. System sceptics were the most susceptible to 
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expressing large-scale conspiracy theories regarding the media, with one example illustrated in 
the following quote: 
It is possible and likely that, let’s say, intelligence agencies … it looks probable that stories 
fed to the mainstream media mostly originate from sources like the CIA and such. It is not 
so simple that everything in the mainstream media is true, but there is also purposeful 
misinformation, and I would say that there is probably lot of it. (Interview 8, translation 
by authors) 
Some system sceptics had completely given up legacy media and instead relied only on PCM sites 
and other alternative online sources. Andrejevic (2013) attributed the declining trust in journalism 
and other traditional societal authorities to the over-supply of information endemic to the 
networked information age. The networked structure in itself encourages constant doubt: by 
following hyperlinks, the user ends up deeper and deeper in the vast network of different sources, 
each of which challenges or contradicts the previous one. This surge of alternative sources 
undermines the authority of institutions traditionally considered to be objective, such as science 
or journalism. According to Andrejevic, this over-supply of information produces ideological 
polarisation, as traditional authorities are challenged, facts and opinions are mixed and 
conspiracy theories become increasingly popular. In a media environment characterised by the 
over-supply of information, constant mistrust and doubt become the norm and are used to shift 
through the endless stream of content and information (see also Coleman, Morrison & Anthony, 
2012: 50). 
System sceptics felt most strongly that their views resided completely outside the dominant 
public sphere. They saw PCM sites as a way to construct and share material that could counter, 
challenge and bypass the ideological power of the mainstream media. System sceptics did not 
believe in dialogue or other collaborative possibilities with legacy media journalists, but instead 
focused on constructing competing counter-publics to rival their influence. In practice, this was 
often done, for example, by using sources that legacy media do not utilise. This position echoes 
the Gramscian counter-hegemonic critique of the mainstream media, highlighting the 
revolutionary hopes involved in the production and consumption of PCM content (c.f. Bailey, 
Cammaerts & Carpentier, 2008: 16–20). In this project, the populist expression and stances were 
often seen as vehicles to get people interested in these matters, and to persuade them to question 
representations and definitions provided by legacy media. These strategies were seen to have at 
least symbolic revolutionary potential, as discussed in the following quote: 
The political elite sees alternative media as a threat. And mainstream media also sees 
them as a threatening factor, because there are high-quality alternative media that speak 
the truth about a plethora of things. So they are seen as a threat, as they are diminishing 
the halo the mainstream media has had in people’s eyes. (Interview 16, translation by 
authors) 
Agenda critics express politicised mistrust 
The second profile consists of agenda critics, whose media scepticism was more specified and 
focused on the media coverage of selected themes and issues. Unlike system sceptics, agenda 
critics saw legacy media as central and influential to their political and ideological aspirations, 
and their media scepticism could be characterised as highly politicised. Typically, agenda critics 
held strong opinions and views of particular issues, and often felt that their opinions and stances 
were not fairly or accurately represented in the dominant public sphere, frequently suggesting 
purposeful media biases. Agenda critics felt that their views were not given fair or legitimate 
attention in serious societal discussion within legacy media journalism. 
The agenda critics identified media organisations as a primary source of bias. Here, editors 
and managers were seen as gatekeepers wielding media power as they liked, using it for their own 
political goals and unjustly silencing critical voices. The notion of the hostile media phenomenon 
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can offer a possible explanation for the media scepticism felt by the agenda critics and their 
engagement with PCM content. The hostile media phenomenon, first demonstrated by Vallone, 
Ross and Lepper (1985), refers to the tendency for individuals with strong preconceived attitudes, 
partisanship and emotional involvement to perceive media material as unfairly biased and hostile 
to the position they advocate. In addition, hostile media perceptions and presumed media 
influence have been linked to increased expressive political behaviours and corrective action 
(e.g. Barnidge & Rojas, 2014), suggesting that people who experience media as biased are more 
prone to voice their opinions in the public sphere in an attempt to correct perceived wrongs. Our 
interviewees often expressed similar aspirations of ‘correcting’ and ‘pointing out’ biases in legacy 
media coverage, and described their efforts to engage in dialogue with journalists, often 
experienced as disappointing and fruitless. 
For the agenda critics, the main reason to engage with PCM was to seek alternative views to 
legacy media coverage regarding themes considered biased and unisonous in the Finnish legacy 
media. Those users engaged with right-wing sites viewed the legacy media as representative of 
‘liberal’, ‘leftist’ and ‘green’ values, and often turned to counter-media websites to consume and 
share content they considered ‘conservative’ and ‘nationalist’. Immigration, Islam, 
multiculturalism, and sexual or ethnic minorities were topics viewed as receiving biased coverage 
in the legacy media. This is similar to the critique in Sweden, where the contributors to ICAM 
sites saw the mainstream media as biased, especially regarding the media’s portrayal of 
immigrants and Islam (Holt, 2017). Concerning economic policy and European Union-related 
issues, legacy media journalism was often criticised for favouring the economic and political elites, 
especially by users who identified as leftist.  
Agenda critics often described incidents where information provided by foreign media 
outlets or other users of social media had contradicted legacy media reporting, raising suspicions 
about the veracity of the material. This highlights the central role of peer networks for these users. 
For media users, the web environment provides a strong sense of authenticity to information that 
seems to originate directly from amateurs and peers (e.g. Coleman, Morrison & Anthony, 
2015: 50). Reliance on peer networks can also be considered a response to the encumbrance that 
mistrust places on media users. The interviewees related that this mistrust made media use taxing 
for them. This burden was also one of the reasons the interviewees mentioned when explaining 
why most of the audience settled for information provided by legacy media. Despite the hard 
work required to find information from alternative sources and peer networks, the interviewees 
frequently implied that discovering content that challenged mainstream information was a 
rewarding experience. 
Agenda critics viewed counter-media as an instrument to bring new opinions to the public 
discussion and force legacy media to consider them in their reporting. They often felt that PCM 
sites had already somewhat succeeded in extending the Finnish public sphere. The 
complementary position was evident when interviewees reflected on the relationship between 
PCM sites and legacy media, which was seen as a reactive two-way interaction, as illustrated by 
the following quote: 
If it has become obvious for mainstream media that alternative media will publish 
something, and that has put them under pressure to react and report that issue in time, 
then I will say that [alternative media have] had an effect in my opinion … if the 
mainstream media would fix itself sometime, then we would, in a way, lose our business; 
we would not have any purpose anymore. (Interview 19, translation by authors) 
The casually discontent rely on savvy scepticism 
The third profile consists of the casually discontent, whose media scepticism derives from multiple 
sources. They typically criticised trends like the tabloidisation and commercialisation of 
journalism, as well as the conduct of individual journalists. They often found legacy media 
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journalism unreliable and lacking in some respects, and turned to social media, online discussion 
forums and PCM sites to find more information about specific incidents and themes. Crime 
reporting in legacy media was especially seen as suffering from too-strict ethical guidelines and 
‘political correctness’, which diminished the accuracy of the reporting, unjustly protected the 
perpetrators and obscured crimes committed by immigrants or members of the elite. 
The casually discontent expressed a wide variety of motives for consuming PCM content; 
however, while the agenda critics and system sceptics placed high political, ideological and even 
revolutionary hopes on counter-media, the casually discontent typically did not. They were often 
motivated by a wish to discover additional or alternative information, but also by sheer curiosity 
or interest in ‘extreme political thought’. They also mentioned enjoying the entertainment value, 
provocative writing and confrontational attitude towards legacy media and the establishment. 
Casually discontent users often expressed that counter-media content should be ‘consumed in a 
proper way’ – in other words, with the detached irony typical of online culture, where nothing 
should be taken too seriously or literally (Phillips, 2015).  
The media scepticism of casually discontent users focused on journalists as individuals and 
attributed biased media content to factors such as work practices, educational background, values, 
political attitudes and journalists’ intentions. They felt that legacy media journalism often worked 
against its own ideals when it churned out poorly sourced and sensationalist news, and used 
misleading headlines to capture audiences’ attention online. Journalism was often seen as too soft 
on elites and politicians; however, this was not attributed to systemic or politicised mistrust, but 
rather to the individual journalists producing the material: 
I would not explain any features of media content or their possible biases with top-down 
conspiracy theories … In my opinion, media content is what it is because the journalists 
are what they are … The prejudices that journalists have are reflected in the media 
content … (Interview 9, translation by authors) 
While critical of legacy media journalism, casually discontent users also expressed critical views 
of PCM sites, often considering them inaccurate and biased. Some parts of counter-media content 
were outright disregarded as ‘nonsense’. The casually discontents’ approach to all media content 
– especially online – has common features with savvy scepticism (Andrejevic, 2013): all media 
representations are seen as inherently suspicious. Simultaneously, savvy scepticism is 
characterised by the users’ confidence in their own competence or intuition to determine the 
veracity of the content and seeing through the facades to real ‘truths’ and motives. This notion 
was evident in our interviewees’ descriptions of how they estimated the trustworthiness of 
information: 
It is similar when you read something from mainstream media; you don’t have to believe 
everything … Let’s say that I read an article (from counter-media): there can be one 
accurate point and then five that are complete flim-flam, in my opinion. But I can ignore 
those five things and acknowledge only the one point from the article. You do not have 
to turn down the whole story because of the flim-flam in between while it also contains 
kernels of truth … (Interview 12, translation by authors) 
The idea of savvy scepticism is also in line with previous studies of active internet users in Finland, 
who do not consider the information provided by legacy media to automatically be more 
trustworthy compared with online sources (Noppari, 2013: 71). Our interviewees described 
consuming and comparing material produced by legacy media, social media and counter-media 
sources without considering any of them as having an authoritative position. When determining 
the trustworthiness of information, it was the content itself, rather than the author or source, that 
was considered the most important factor. 
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Results and discussion 
The three user profiles we have presented in this article highlight vastly different motivations for 
Finnish users engaging with populist counter-media websites. The results illustrate that the appeal 
of this type of partisan online content can be explained by divergent factors among different user 
groups. This suggests that, instead of simply attributing the proliferation of partisan online media 
content to post-truth or insufficient media literacy, multiple developments, including 
technological-, cultural-, social-, political- and individual-level phenomena, should be examined 
in tandem to account for the emergence and popularity of PCM websites. 
All the user profiles highlight the growing importance of the affective choices made by 
individual actors in the current high-choice hybrid media environment (Chadwick, 2017). Our 
research concludes that the users did not engage with PCM content because they could not 
distinguish it from legacy media journalism or were unaware of its partisan nature (the media 
literacy approach); rather, they made active, affective and conscious choices to consume and 
engage with material that contradicted the agendas and views of the dominant public sphere and 
promoted strong ideological stances expressed via populist address. Andrejevic (2013) argues that, 
in an environment marked by an over-supply of information, the individual who decides what to 
consume and trust – and what not to – becomes the focal actor. Media are consumed very 
selectively and individually, and according to our interviews, this is especially true when it comes 
to various forms of online media content. As illustrated by the profiles, the hybrid media 
environment simultaneously provides new tools and possibilities for users to participate in media 
production and distribution, from sharing and commenting on content to producing and 
publishing it online (Das, 2018). Therefore, as well as consumption, these affective choices can 
more often also manifest as various ways of participating in the distribution and production of 
media material.  
To a large degree, feeling marginalised or alienated by traditional media outlets was a key 
reason for media mistrust, as system sceptics and agenda critics especially positioned themselves 
in a subordinate public position. They perceived their views and opinions to be either not 
discussed in the dominant public sphere maintained by legacy media or presented in prejudiced 
or biased ways. The popularity of counter-media websites can be seen as one manifestation of 
how actors with issues and views considered unfit, difficult or detestable by the dominant public 
sphere are able to produce their own public spheres elsewhere.  
Eroding trust in legacy media journalism and other traditional societal institutions can be 
viewed as another symptom of this development, and our findings illustrate that even Nordic 
countries characterised by high societal trust are not immune to this type of effect. Some features 
in the Finnish media system may even encourage the establishment of counter-publics. 
Democratic-corporatist media systems often feature an underlying tendency of societal and 
political consensus, and these efforts typically have been supported by legacy media (Hallin & 
Mancini, 2004: 50–3, 183–97). Similarly to Holt’s (2017: 9–10) observations in Sweden, the 
perceived ‘corridor of opinion’ and lack of certain news and perspective in legacy media may 
create readily available niches for different types of alternative media. 
Although Finland’s combination of relatively high trust in legacy media journalism and the 
neutral press system can be considered an outlier even among Western democratic countries, the 
media scepticism and mistrust felt by individuals engaged with PCM sites can be seen as one 
indicator of deeper underlying changes in the media culture. The question of mistrust is not limited 
to PCM site users, but includes regular news users as well (Coleman et al., 2012), and general 
media audiences in Finland have expressed similar journalism criticism in previous studies 
(e.g. Heikkilä, Ahva & Siljamäki, 2012). Declining public trust in journalism as an authority may 
have significant societal consequences, especially as many accounts indicate multiple 
connections between a deteriorating trust in journalism and an increasing lack of confidence in 
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established political systems and other societal institutions (Hanitzsch, Van Dalen & Steindl, 
2018; Tsfati & Cohen, 2013). 
We therefore suggest that attention should be shifted from problematic concepts of truth and 
veracity dominating the post-truth framing to the ways in which trust and mistrust in media content 
are constructed and negotiated among different audience groups. This is essential for media 
scholars looking to better understand how people navigate and assess information in complex, 
high-choice hybrid media ecosystems, but also increasingly to political scientists trying to grasp 
how trust and mistrust are used to mobilise the ideological and stylistic elements of populism 
utilised by various actors in the contemporary media environment. 
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Notes 
1  Not to be confused with another website called www.counterfire.org. 
2  Finding interviewees was laborious, as several of the sites operate anonymously or under 
pseudonyms, and the contributors were often unresponsive to our contact efforts or 
suspicious of our motives. We approached several sites or contributors directly via email 
or other communication channels, with moderate success, and managed to get in contact 
with some interviewees by utilising our social contacts. In addition, we were often able to 
convince the previous interviewees to introduce us to their contacts and acquaintances, 
effectively starting the snowball sampling process. 
                                               
